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ABSTRACT 
 
Does an apparent (minor) anomaly, said to occur not infrequently in elementary 
expositions of supply and demand theory, really imply – as seems to be suggested 
– that there is something a bit odd about Marshall’s diagrammatic handling of 
demand and supply? On investigation, we find some interesting differences of 
focus and exposition amongst the theorists who first developed the ‘geometric’ 
treatment of demand and supply, but find no reason, despite his differences from 
other marginalist pioneers such as Cournot, Dupuit and Walras, to consider 
Marshall’s treatment either as unconventional or forced, or as to regard him as 
the ‘odd man out’. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the standard textbooks, introductory discussions of demand and supply normally treat 
quantities demanded and supplied as functions of price (rather than vice versa), and complement 
that discussion with diagrams in the standard format, showing price on the vertical axis and 
quantities demanded and supplied on the horizontal axis. No references need be cited. Usually 
this presentation is accepted without comment, but it can happen that a more numerate student 
observes that something of an anomaly appears to exist – in that the diagrams show price, which, 
                                                 
1
 Roy’s thanks go to Darryl Holden who raised the question about Marshall's diagrams, and for 
his subsequent advice, and to Eric Rahim, as always, for valuable comment.
 2
in the text, has been presented as the independent variable, on the ordinate (vertical axis) and the 
dependent variable (quantity demanded or supplied) on the abscissa (horizontal axis), rather than, 
as would accord with mathematical convention, with the axes transposed (measuring the 
independent variable along the x-axis). 
 
If raised, the point is likely to be dismissed with an airy reassurance that this is just how 
economists do these things, or perhaps with a reference to the fact that this was the diagrammatic 
convention adopted by Alfred Marshall, the great English pioneer of supply and demand 
analysis, and that the profession has subsequently, and unquestioningly, followed his lead.  
 
Although there does seem to be something a little peculiar here, this oddity or anomaly has not 
attracted much attention. However, A. K. Whitaker, an authority on Marshall, has commented on 
the matter. In suggesting an explanation, he focuses on the Marshallian inheritance (Whitaker, 
1987): 
 
It is probably due to Marshall’s influence that English-speaking economists still graph demand and 
supply curves with quantity on the horizontal axis even though adopting a more Walrasian 
perspective which treats quantities demanded and supplied as functions of market price. 
 
And he remarks further: 
 
Marshall recognized (1920, p.457n) that it would be more natural when dealing with market 
demand to view quantity as a function of price, as Cournot (1838, pp.44-55) had done, but he chose 
the converse approach to maintain symmetry with his treatment of supply. Believing in the 
importance of scale economies in production, he deemed it generally impossible to treat quantity 
supplied per unit of time as a single-valued function of market price. Instead, adopting what he took 
to be the businessman’s perspective, he introduced the concept of ‘supply price’, the minimum 
uniform price at which any given quantity will be supplied in the market. 
  
Taking Whitaker’s two comments together, it appears that, firstly, he attributes the anomaly in 
question to the general adoption, by ‘English-speaking economists’ of Marshall’s diagrammatic 
treatment, whereby quantity is measured along the horizontal axis, despite that depiction being 
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inconsistent with the usage common in discussion (which is to treat price as the independent 
variable) and, secondly, he is hinting that Marshall himself was not altogether happy with his 
own diagrammatic representation, and might even have preferred the ‘Continental’ alternative, a 
la Cournot.  
 
Why then, we may ask, did Marshall choose a different mode of diagrammatic presentation from 
that adopted by other pioneers of marginalist theory, as, for instance, Cournot, Dupuit and 
Walras? Whitaker seems to imply that Marshall was out on a limb, and not really because he 
wanted to be there. Is there then something odd about the manner in which the Marshallian 
diagram, to which we have become so accustomed, is drawn? Could it have been because 
Marshall flouted mathematical convention that this anomaly arises?   
 
While we readily admit these are hardly issues of life and death, there does seem to be some 
fogginess around them: if we are to clarify the picture we need to know just how Marshall and 
other early exponents of ‘economic geometry’ handled diagrams of demand and supply, and we 
need to work out, if we can, why they chose to proceed in the ways that they did. Let us make a 
(brief) tour of the territory, recognising, however, that to understand the contexts out of which 
the various demand and supply curves emerged, some detail may at times be necessary. In order 
to set Marshall in context, we begin by reviewing the treatment of demand and supply favoured 
by marginalist pioneers other than Marshall. We then examine Marshall’s practice. 
 
Demand and supply with price on the horizontal axis 
 
Let us consider first those early ‘marginalist’ authors who employed a graphical exposition, but 
who, unlike Marshall, drew their diagrams with price on the horizontal axis and quantity on the 
vertical. 
 
It is appropriate that we start with A A Cournot (1801-1877), a highly original thinker, 
mathematician and philosopher, and the first economist actually to draw demand and supply 
curves. With respect to demand, Cournot writes D = ƒ(p), and (assuming the function to be 
continuous), ‘takes it as an empirical proposition that it is downward-sloping (the loi de débit, 
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‘law of demand’) and proceeds to draw it in price-quantity space’2. Consistent with his treatment 
of price as the independent variable, he places price on the horizontal axis and quantity on the 
vertical. From our perspective it is relevant to note that Cournot, in sharp contrast to authors such 
as Gossen, Jevons and Marshall himself, categorically excluded from his analysis of demand, 
and construction of the demand curve, all subjective factors to which reference might have been 
made. His ‘demand function’ therefore, rather than showing a relationship between price and the 
quantity agents sought to buy, represented simply an empirical relationship between price and 
quantity sold.3 We take it that, as a mathematician, Cournot recognised the existence of a 
functional relationship between price and quantity demanded, but held, again as a 
mathematician, that it was not his role to become involved with subjective concepts and 
imprecise quantities. In his own words, (1838, p.47) he wanted nothing to do with ‘ideas of 
utility, scarcity and suitability to the needs of mankind’ which he considered ‘variable and by 
nature indeterminate, and consequently ill suited for the foundation of a scientific theory.’ 
  
Cournot’s attention was initially directed to the side of demand rather than supply. He observed 
that as price varied, and quantity bought altered, the seller’s revenue was systematically affected: 
in terms of his diagram, corresponding to each price on the demand curve, a price–quantity 
rectangle represented the revenue obtained at that selling price. This perception (together with 
the assumption that costs were either zero or independent of quantity produced) allowed him to 
identify the price which a profit-maximising monopolist would charge to maximise revenue. 
Cournot is famous also for having formally specified elasticity of demand as percentage change 
in quantity demanded over percentage change in price. A further contribution was the 
introduction of a supply curve depicting output as an increasing function of price, based on the 
assumption that marginal costs increased with output. It will be noticed that Cournot’s 
measurement of price along the horizontal axis accords with his working out of these several 
‘thought experiments’, in which, in each case, price is taken as the independent variable.  
 
Jules Dupuit (1804–1866), civil engineer and economist, was not only, like Cournot, a pioneer of 
marginal analysis, but was also one of those who (independently) discovered the marginal utility 
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principle. He identified the concept of consumers’ surplus, also the phenomenon of deadweight 
loss due to monopoly pricing, and investigated the implications of discriminatory pricing.  
 
As a practical civil engineer, Dupuit’s concern was – as the title of his 1844 paper has it –
‘measurement of the utility of public works’ – i.e. of works such as canals, railways and bridges. 
He appraises methods of measurement suggested by others, by for example J B Say and L 
Navier, and puts forward in place of their demonstrably inadequate procedures, his own 
proposal, which was to estimate the benefit to society by measuring the value of what, in modern 
terminology, we call consumers’ surplus (or a change therein), as attributable to the project in 
question. He employed a downward-sloping demand curve, and clearly identified as the measure 
of consumers’ surplus the area under under the demand curve and above the cost schedule. Being 
prepared to estimate a money value for the consumers’ surplus accruing in specified 
circumstances, Dupuit evidently did not share Cournot’s doubts about the feasibility of 
measuring (at least making some sort of measure of) utility. 
 
Although Dupuit is credited with discovery of the concept of diminishing marginal utility, he did 
not offer any explanation of why that should be so. There is no discussion, as in Gossen or 
Jevons, of the ‘pleasure principle’, or of any sort of utility function: in his famous 1844 paper 
Dupuit seems simply to take it as an observed fact that willingness to pay for extra increments of 
a good diminishes with quantity already acquired. For example (1844/1952, p.86) he says, 
 
Thus, examining the facts more closely, we have come to see that the utility of everything which is 
consumed varies according to the person consuming it. Nor is this all: each consumer himself 
attaches a different utility to the same thing according to the quantity which he can consume. Thus, 
a purchaser who would have bought 100 bottles at10 sous might only buy 50 at 15 sous and 30 
bottles at 20 sous.  
 
Then, approaching the concept of consumers’ surplus (1844/1952, p.89): 
 
To sum up, political economy has to take as the measure of the utility of an object the maximum 
sacrifice which each consumer would be willing to make to acquire the object. 
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By a ‘thought experiment’ he makes the point that the value of a commodity to the consumer can 
be measured by the whole area under the demand curve (1844/1952, p.96): 
 
             Suppose that all these . . . commodities of which we want to discover the utilities, are all subjected 
to a tax which rises by small steps. Each successive increase will cause a certain quantity of our 
commodity to disappear from consumption. This quantity, multiplied by the rate of tax, will give its 
utility expressed in money. By thus letting the tax go up until there are no more consumers, and by 
adding together all the products of this multiplication process, we will arrive at the total utility of 
the goods.  
 
He subsequently notes (1844/1952, p.97) that, if costs of production are involved, it is the area 
under the demand curve, net of costs, that constitutes the net (or as he calls it ‘relative’ or 
‘definitive’) social value of a commodity. 
 
Using this model, Dupuit examines the effects on social welfare of various possible events – 
changes in tolls or taxes, changes in costs of production; this eventually leads him back to his 
critique of other suggested methods of evaluation, concluding with the point that, in estimating 
the benefit accruing from transport improvements, such improvements should be evaluated by 
the extent to which they reduce overall costs of production (and not by whatever change in 
transport costs, as such, results). 
 
After commenting that the variability of real-world data (‘dependent on the volatile will of 
human beings’), implies that ‘it is of no avail to try to determine [price-quantity relationships] 
exactly by experience or groping experiment’, Dupuit (1844/1952, p.103) observes however ‘that 
there do exist certain general laws . . . One of these laws is that consumption expands when price 
falls; another, that the increase in consumption due to a price fall will be greater, the lower the 
initial price.’ 
 
Finally, in a ‘note’ appended to his text, Dupuit explains how his demand curve is drawn 
(1844/1952, pp.106-107): 
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If it be supposed . . . that along a [horizontal] line Op the lengths Op, Op’, Op” . . . represent 
various prices for an article, and that the verticals pn, p’n’, p”n” . . . represent the number of articles 
consumed corresponding to these prices, then it is possible to construct a curve Nnn’n”P which we 
shall call the curve of consumption. ON represents the quantity consumed when the price is zero, 
and OP’ the price at which consumption falls to zero. . . . The utility of a natural product the 
acquisition of which requires no expense, is expressed by the large triangle NOP.   
 
Given that throughout Dupuit’s discussion of demand and value, every single example presented, 
every thought experiment conducted, takes the form of an inquiry as to the effect of price change 
on quantity demanded or on amount of surplus accruing to consumers, it is no cause for surprise 
that, in constructing his diagrams, Dupuit treats price as the independent variable, placing it on 
the horizontal axis. Giving priority to price in that way is consistent with his primary focus being 
on the impact of cost changes on social welfare; while accepting diminishing marginal utility as 
an empirical fact, Dupuit doesn’t seem to have been interested in investigating the phenomenon 
more deeply, in the manner of Gossen or Jevons or of Marshall himself, or explaining to his 
readers its philosophical or psychological foundations. 
 
It was H C Fleeming Jenkin4 (1833-1885), a distinguished Edinburgh electrical engineer and 
inventor, who ‘introduced demand and supply curves – indeed the technique of diagrammatic 
analysis – into the English [i.e. Anglo-Saxon] economic literature c1870’ (Humphrey, 1992, 
p.14). (Marshall, as reported by Edgeworth, was much chagrined when Professor Foxwell drew 
his attention to Jenkin’s 1870 article shortly after its publication.)  
 
Jenkin formulated (in 1868) demand and supply functions, D = ƒ(A + 1/x) and S = ƒ(B + x), 
where x = price and (in 1870) represented these equations in graphical form (Jenkin, 1877/1931). 
Like Cournot and Dupuit he showed price on the horizontal axis and quantity on the vertical5. He 
interpreted, as Dupuit had done, the inverse functional relationship between price and demand as 
reflecting the fact that lower price compensated for diminishing marginal utility as quantity 
                                                 
4
 Jenkin’s unusual first name is correctly pronounced ‘Flemming’; he was named after an admiral, ‘one of his father’s 
protectors – his father was an officer - in the navy’ (Source: Robert Louis Stevenson (1887/1924, p.21). 
5
 While Jenkin clearly had his own good reason (given the theses he was presenting) for placing price on the vertical axis, he 
may by then also have had, as a model, Dupuit’s diagrams; Eklund and Hébert note (1999, p.348) that Jenkin evidently came 
across Dupuit’s work ‘sometime between 1868 and 1871’.  
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purchased increased. He proposed both short and a long-run supply curves, each upward-sloping: 
in the short-run quantity supplied was said to rise with price, the price increase drawing an 
increasing proportion of stocks on to the market; in the long-run higher prices bid resources 
away from alternative uses, so permitting production to increase. Jenkin, using his demand-
supply diagram, conducted other ‘thought experiments’, demonstrating that, as he supposed, 
higher wages achieved by trade unions would restrict employment, and also how the burden of a 
tax-caused price rise is distributed between consumers and producers. 
 
It would seem therefore that Jenkin’s diagrammatic representation of demand and supply with 
price on the horizontal axis was perfectly in accord with his analytical focus (in the manner of 
Dupuit) on the consequences of changes in price. 
 
Leon Walras (1834-1910), with mathematical expertise attributable to his training as an engineer, 
was one of the great original thinkers who brought about the ‘marginal revolution’. He is famous 
particularly for pioneering the development of neoclassical general equilibrium theory. 
 
His attention was directed to investigating the possibility of attaining market-clearing 
equilibrium in a multi-market economic system; he proceeded by modelling the behaviour of 
optimising agents deciding quantities to buy or sell, given the prices they face in competitive 
markets. In getting down to serious analytical business (Walras, 1874/1977, Lesson 5, p.84) 
directs the reader’s attention to the functioning the market: 
 
The market is a place where commodities are exchanged. Thus the phenomenon of value in 
exchange manifests itself in the market, and we must go to the market to study value in exchange. 
 
Value in exchange, when left to itself, arises spontaneously in the market as the result of 
competition. . . . The more perfectly competition functions, the more rigorous is the manner of 
arriving at value in exchange. The markets which are best organised from the competitive 
standpoint are those in which purchases and sales are made by auction . . .  
 
The behaviour of market traders is then illustrated – buyers and sellers are shown as responding 
to price. An individual buyer (of commodity a) will have in mind, we are told, a demand 
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schedule relating all possible values of pa and the corresponding qa he would wish to buy. ‘Now 
anyone at all familiar with mathematics knows there are two ways of representing this schedule 
mathematically.’ One, as demonstrated, is by drawing a graph (ibid., pp.93-94). On the 
horizontal axis he places price and on the vertical, quantity demanded; the demand schedule is 
then represented geometrically by the curve drawn (as illustrated) through the points showing 
quantity demanded at different prices. Alternatively, as Walras observes, the demand schedule 
(for commodity a) may be represented algebraically by the equation of this curve, da = ƒ(pa). 
 
It is not until lesson 8 (ibid., p.115ff) that Walras, having discussed exchange with the aid of his 
downward-sloping demand curve, turns to an explanation of the shape of the curve: why, he 
asks, is there an increase in demand with a reduction of price? The explanation given runs in 
terms of what he calls ‘intensive utility’, i.e., the utility gained by the consumer when ‘the 
magnitude of the sacrifice affects the quantity consumed’ of the commodity in question. Side-
stepping any difficulty that there might be in measuring intensive utility, Walras simply assumes 
that ‘a direct and measurable relationship does exist’ such that ‘we shall find ourselves in a 
position to give an exact, mathematical account of the respective influences on prices of 
extensive utility, intensive utility and the initial stock possessed’. A diagram is provided, with 
quantity of commodity consumed on the vertical axis and, on the horizontal axis, quantity of 
intensive utility. A ‘utility’ or ‘want’ curve is drawn relating intensive utility to the amount of 
commodity consumed; Walras notes, ‘whether the curve be continuous or discontinuous, I 
postulate that intensive utilities always diminish from that of the first unit or fraction of a unit 
consumed to that of the last unit or fraction of a unit consumed’. Then finally:  
 
If, now, we let the term rareté designate the intensity of the last want satisfied by any given  
quantity consumed of a commodity, then the curve . . . becomes our individual’s rareté curve, 
considered as a function of the quantity of [the commodity] he consumes. . . . We must postulate, I 
repeat, that rareté increases as the quantity possessed decreases, and vice versa. 
 
It will be noted – using more familiar terminology – that here we have a diagram showing 
marginal utility diminishing as quantity consumed increases, but drawn with quantity (the 
independent variable) on the vertical axis and marginal utility on the horizontal.  
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Diminishing marginal utility is explained, somewhat simpler terms, in Appendix I – Geometrical 
Theory of the Determination of Prices (Walras, 1874/1977, pp.461ff), which, in the third edition, 
was added to Walras’s text: 
 
We may say in ordinary language: ‘The want which we have for things, or the utility which things 
have for us, diminishes gradually as consumption increases. The more a man eats, the less hungry 
he is; the more he drinks the less thirsty, at least in general and apart from certain deplorable 
exceptions. The more hats and shoes a man has, the less need he has of a new hat or a new pair of 
shoes; the more horses he has in his stables, the less effort he will make to procure another horse . . 
.’ But in mathematical terms we say: ‘the intensity of the last want satisfied is a decreasing function 
of the quantity of the commodity consumed’. 
 
Again, the associated diagrams have quantity on the vertical and rarete (marginal utility) on the 
horizontal axis. What, we may ask, is going on here? Why is Walras apparently ignoring 
convention and representing the independent variable – quantity consumed – on the vertical 
axis? We suggest that the answer lies in the fact that, from an overall perspective (as hinted at in 
Walras’s initial observations about markets to which we referred earlier) Walras’s analytical 
focus was on ultimately on the attainment of market equilibrium, both in the individual market, 
and in terms of general equilibrium, throughout the whole interdependent set of markets within 
the economy – specifically on the attainment of equilibrium via quantity adjustments in response 
to price signals. 
 
Walras’s stylised account of adjustment to equilibrium – the famous tâtonnement process – 
depicts a (hypothetical) phase by phase process of attainment of market-clearing equilibrium: 
trial prices are set (‘cried’) at each stage of the process; agents respond by adjusting quantities 
demanded and supplied to these prices presented to them. What is envisaged is a sort of auction, 
in which a notional ‘auctioneer’ calls out a set of prices for all commodities being traded, and 
traders make known their demands and supplies at the prices quoted. If quantities demanded and 
supplied are not equal, a different set of prices is proposed, and traders adjust their quantities 
demanded and supplied to the new relative prices. As Walras puts it (p.242): ‘When a price is 
cried, and the effective demand and offer corresponding to this price are not equal, another price 
is cried for which there is another corresponding effective demand and offer . . .’ Thus (pp.169-
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170), in the context of a model with m commodities (and m-1 prices in terms of a numeraire), the 
auctioneer keeps changing prices when markets are found not to clear:  
 
If the total demand equalled the total offer of each and every commodity . . . the exchange would 
take place [at the given prices] and the problem [of achieving equilibrium] would be solved. 
Generally, however, the total demand will not equal the total offer of each and every commodity . . 
.  What will happen on the market then? If the demand for any one commodity is greater than the 
offer, the price of that commodity in terms of the numéraire will rise; if the offer is greater than the 
demand, the price will fall. 
 
And correspondingly (referring to the attainment of equilibrium relative values in a ‘production’ 
system) the agents in the market adjust quantities demanded and supplied according to the price 
on offer (p.476): 
 
We may then enunciate the following proposition which is specific to the theory of production: 
equality between the selling price of products and the cost of the productive services employed in 
their manufacture is attained by increasing the quantity of those products the selling price of which 
exceeds the cost of production and by d0ecreasing the quantity of those products the cost of 
production of which exceeds the selling price. 
 
Our interpretation of Walras’s diagrammatic convention of consistently measuring price on the 
abscissa and quantity on the ordinate, despite explaining diminishing marginal utility as a 
function of quantity, is that his graphical treatment reflected his primary analytical purpose, that 
of modelling the attainment of market-clearing equilibrium, with the process of adjustment 
viewed in terms of agents responding by making quantity adjustments in response to the price 
signals presented to them. 
 
The other way round: quantity represented as the independent variable 
 
H H Gossen (1810-1858) is recognised as another (independent) discoverer of the principle of 
marginal utility. In his treatise on The Laws of Human Relations and the Rules of Action Derived 
 12
Therefrom (1854) this lone thinker invented and employed a marginalist analysis to expound a 
utilitarian vision of how maximum individual pleasure and social happiness may be achieved. 
 
Man wants to enjoy life and makes it his goal to increase pleasures enjoyed throughout life to the 
highest possible level. . . . Not only is this maximisation viewed by all men without exception as 
life’s ultimate purpose, it also is undoubtedly the real purpose of man’s life, willed by his Creator. . 
. [Who] has established order among His human beings. As He has forever and immutably 
predetermined the paths of the planets by the laws of gravitation, He has predetermined for all 
eternity and invariably for all men the pattern of their social existence by the laws governing their 
power of enjoyment. 
                                                                                           (Gossen, 1854/1984, p.3) 
 
It was the duty, therefore, of the thinker and scholar, to reveal these laws and ensure their 
comprehension ‘in a manner that is best for the welfare of all mankind’6. With respect to the 
particular responsibilities of the economic theorist, Gossen argued that ‘national economics’ (as 
the subject was then called in Germany) must be replaced by a ‘science of pleasure’ – developing 
the understanding necessary to guide individual behaviour and social policy. Gossen’s study is 
accordingly framed as an investigation of ‘the general laws of pleasure and economic value’.  
 
In Gossen’s treatise consumption and production are envisaged in terms of what Jevons was later 
to call ‘a calculus of pleasure and pain’. The law of diminishing marginal utility, considered one 
of the fundamental laws of creation, is stated as being, in effect, self-evident.  
(Gossen, 1854/1983, p.6) 
 
For its genuineness or truth, this revelation needs no human testimony: it confirms itself in such an 
indubitable manner that any proof seems superfluous 7.  
 
                                                 
6
  As summed-up by N. Georgescu –Roegen (Gossen, 1854/1983, p.lxv) what, on that understanding, is required of humanity 
is very straightforward: ‘All that man has to do to obtain the highest bliss is to study and follow the laws established by the 
Creator’.  
7
 Gossen nevertheless adds that ‘daily life offers thousands of instances confirming both of these attributes’, and supplies 
examples. 
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In accordance, the, with this principle, an attempt must first be made to explore the laws according 
to which the force of enjoyment operates. Upon closer examination of the process of enjoyment, 
one finds the following common characteristics of all acts of enjoyment: 
A.1 The magnitude (intensity) of pleasure decreases continuously if we continue to satisfy one and 
the same enjoyment without interruption until satiety is ultimately reached. 
A.2 A similar decrease of magnitude (intensity) takes place if we repeat a previously experienced 
pleasure. 
 
He observes that as ‘the incalculable importance of this law makes it desirable to obtain the 
clearest possible notion of it’, ‘a geometric diagram may be of help here’. We immediately arrive 
at the first of Gossen’s diagrams (1854/1984, p.9). 
 
Such a diagram can be drawn in the following manner: Let the time during which a pleasure lasts 
be represented by [the horizontal] line ab . . . [Gossen is using time (i.e. period of consumption) as a 
proxy for the quantity of the good consumed]; One may then imagine a perpendicular line erected 
at each point on the line ab, as shown . . . Let the height of each of these perpendicular lines be 
proportionate to the pleasure experienced . . . [then connect the end points of the verticals [from c to 
r]. . . . The line cr, whatever may be its particular shape, if followed from c to r, must move 
continuously and without interruption closer and closer to the line ab. For it is precisely this 
convergence, that is, the shortening of the perpendiculars on ab, that expresses geometrically the 
decrease of pleasure through continued enjoyment.  
 
We may say that, given the nature of the basic principle – that each increment of pleasure 
diminishes as the quantity increases, there is no way in which, as a mathematician, Gossen could 
have presented, as an aid to understanding, his ‘geometric diagram’ other than with quantity 
consumed  measured along the x-axis and pleasure derived along the y-axis. 
 
Subsequently, Gossen having moved on to discussion of ‘the exchange economy’, with money 
featured as the medium of exchange, the above utility function turns directly into a demand 
curve. ‘As everything is exchangeable for money, money becomes the common yardstick for the 
determination of the various p in our notation [p denoting ‘quantities of pleasure’].’ (Gossen, 
1954/1984, p.108) 
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Finally, we may note that - complementing his account of how a commodity demand curve 
reflects the phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility – Gossen (1854/1984, pp.40-48) derives, 
and illustrates with the appropriate diagram, a supply curve which, on account of increasing 
disutility (‘discomfort’) of labour, he understands to be upward rising, reflecting the higher 
inducement required to elicit higher labour supply. (‘Discomfort becomes greater and greater 
with uninterrupted movement’ – i.e. the greater the amount of continuous effort, the more the 
pain.) The diagram naturally shows the dependent variable (discomfort) on the vertical axis as a 
function of hours worked. 
 
It is evident that, given Gossen’s identification of marginal utility (and disutility) as dependent 
variables, functions of quantity, his chosen diagrammatic format - in illustrating what he 
regarded as a basic law of creation - directly reflected his interpretation of the causal relationship 
and, at the same time, accorded, as he would be well aware, with mathematical convention. 
 
Two other nineteenth century German economists, Karl Heinrich Rau (1792-1870) and Hans von 
Mangoldt (1824-1868) may be mentioned. 
 
Rau, quite independently of Cournot, introduced a supply and demand diagram in a Note and 
developed a more elaborate version in a well-regarded text book (Rau, 1841)8 which went into 
several editions. He placed quantity on the horizontal axis and price on the vertical. He used this 
construction to demonstrate the stability of market-clearing equilibrium; his argument was to the 
effect that inequality of quantities demanded and supplied would, as the case might be, cause 
price to rise or fall until equilibrium was restored. 
 
Hans von Mangoldt (a more important theorist), adopted Rau’s diagram, twenty years after its 
original publication, as the basis of his own demand and supply analysis (von Mangoldt, 1863)9. 
His stability analysis, like that of Rau, focused on the price-equilibrating role of excess demand 
or supply (see Humphrey, 1992, p.10). Mangoldt interpreted the demand curve as reflecting the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility, noting that the height of each point on the curve 
                                                 
8
  See Humphrey, 1992, pp.5-6 regarding Rau. 
9
  See ibid., pp.10-151, regarding Mangoldt. 
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represents the marginal utility of the corresponding quantity. As regards supply curves he was 
(see again Humphrey, 1992, p.11) ‘the first to draw such curves with different shapes depending 
on the behaviour of costs of production’; his analysis (supply price as a function of volume of 
output) comprehended all sorts of cases – of constant, increasing and decreasing costs, taking 
account both of economies and diseconomies of scale.   
 
Again we can say that, in the cases these two German economists, the chosen diagrammatic 
representation of demand and supply - quantity on the horizontal axis - accords with 
mathematical convention by matching their analytical identification of demand price, supply 
price and market price as dependent variables, the values of which were the objects of 
explanation10. 
 
Jevons, W. S. (1835-1882), considered to be one of the principal founders of neoclassical 
economics, was yet another, independent discover of the concept of diminishing marginal utility. 
This ‘law’ he first proposed in a paper presented to the British Association in 1862; he further 
developed the marginalist approach in his Theory of Political Economy (1871). Although, when 
he published these expositions of diminishing marginal utility and its implications, he was 
unaware of the contributions of Gossen or of Dupuit, he developed his analysis very much in the 
manner of Gossen, expounding a utilitarian theory of pleasure and pain.  
 
Pleasure and pain are undoubtedly the ultimate objects of the calculus of economics. To satisfy our 
wants to the utmost with the least effort – to procure the greatest amount of what is desirable at the 
expense of the least that is undesirable – in other words, to maximise pleasure, is the problem of 
economics (Jevons, 1871/1970, p.101). 
 
Like Gossen, Jevons took an optimistic view of the possibility of applying mathematical methods 
to economics. As he famously stated in the Preface to the first edition of his Political Economy: 
 
                                                 
10
  Humphrey (1992, p.14) alludes to the unhappy fate of Mangoldt’s diagrams: ‘Mangoldt’s diagrammatic analysis should 
have become common property to all economists by the 1870s. That it did not is attributable to one Friedrich Kleinwächter 
who, upon publishing a reprint of Mangoldt’s book in 1871 shortly after his death, deleted the diagrams on the grounds that 
‘it is utterly inconceivable to me that graphs or mathematical formulae could facilitate the understanding of economic laws’. 
It was not until 1894 that Mangoldt’s contribution was recovered (by Edgeworth). 
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In this work I have attempted to treat economy as a calculus of pleasure and pain, and have 
sketched out, almost irrespective of previous opinions, the form which the science, as it seems to 
me, must ultimately take. I have long thought that as it deals throughout with quantities, it must be a 
mathematical science in manner, if not in language. I have endeavoured to arrive at accurate 
quantitative notions concerning utility, value labour, capital, etc., and I have often been surprised to 
find how clearly some of the most difficult notions, especially that most puzzling of notions value, 
admit of mathematical analysis and expression (Jevons, 1871/1970, p.44) 
 
On the supposition that pleasure and pain can be treated as quantities of two dimensions 
(intensity and duration) he draws attention to the fact that, in the case of each, intensity of feeling 
varies with the length of time over which the feeling is experienced. This is illustrated 
diagrammatically (Jevons, 1871/1970, p.96).  
 
[Time, in minutes, is measured along Ox, the horizontal axis; along the vertical (Oy) we measure 
intensity of pleasure.] The quantity of pleasure each minute may be represented by a rectangle 
whose base is supposed to correspond to the duration of a minute, and whose height is proportional 
to the intensity of the feeling during the minute in question. Each of these rectangles represents the 
feeling of one minute. The aggregate quantity of feeling generated during the time in question will 
then be represented by the aggregate area of the relevant rectangles. In the case illustrated the 
intensity of the feeling (pleasure in this instance) is supposed to be gradually declining as time (i.e. 
total quantity of feeling) increases. [This representation is subsequently replaced by the more 
general form of a smooth ‘pleasure function’.] 
 
Then, quoting Bentham, ‘pleasure’ becomes ‘utility’ (Jevons, 1871/1970, p.102): 
 
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, 
pleasure, good, or happiness (all this, in the present case, comes to the same thing), or (what comes 
again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the 
party whose interest is considered. 
 
At this stage, in place of the ‘pleasure function’ we are presented with a corresponding utility 
function, quantity being measured along Ox and utility vertically. Note that, Jevons, observing 
that ‘we must express these notions in appropriate mathematical language’, proposes 
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(1871/1970, p.109): ‘let x signify, as is usual in mathematical books, the quantity which varies 
independently – in this case the quantity of commodity.’ Then, turning to the diagram, he 
explains: 
 
            The law of the variation of the degree of utility may thus be represented by a continuous curve and 
the perpendicular height of each point of the curve above the [horizontal] line Ox represents the 
degree of utility of the commodity when a certain amount has been consumed. . . . The degree of 
utility is, in mathematical language, the differential coefficient of u considered as a function of x, 
and will itself be another function of x. 
 
And adds, 
 
            We shall seldom need to consider the degree of utility except as regards the last increment which has 
been consumed, or, which comes to the same thing, the next increment which is about to be 
consumed. I shall therefore commonly use the expression final degree of utility, as meaning the 
degree of utility of the last addition, or the next possible addition, of a very small, or infinitely 
small, quantity to the existing stock. 
 
It is only a short step from Jevons’s utility function to his demand curve. In a monetary 
economy, commodity values, including the relative values of successive increments of a 
commodity, are estimated in terms of money. Thus the curve representing the diminishing degree 
of utility received by the buyer of a commodity as successive units are purchased becomes an 
indicator of the diminishing monetary value attached to these units. In this guise it is, of course, 
the demand schedule The height of the demand curve at any point along it indicates the demand 
price of that quantity of the commodity. It is evident that, in spelling out in such detail the steps 
of the argument - from pleasure to utility, and from utility to demand price – Jevons (like 
Gossen) was determined to ensure that the reader fully appreciated the philosophical and 
psychological underpinnings (of which his diagram supplies a reminder) of the demand function 
being derived. 
 
Lastly, regarding Jevons’s analysis of demand and supply, we observe that he develops a (sort 
of) supply schedule on the basis, so to say, of inverting his theory of consumer demand, to arrive 
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at a theory of labour supply, in which the supply price of labour increases, because of the 
increasing ‘pain’ (disutility) experienced as hours devoted to labour increase. As graphed 
(Jevons, 1970, p.192) with hours of labour on the horizontal axis, and price of labour (wage rate) 
on the vertical, the curve, which at first dips – reflecting some initial enjoyment of work – 
eventually rises reflecting the need for a progressively greater inducement to accept a longer 
working time as hours of work increase. 
 
In concluding our discussion of Jevons, we may note that the basic demand and supply diagram 
(see, for instance, Fig.8, Jevons, 1871/1970, p.192), with quantity on the horizontal axis and 
price on the vertical, very neatly depicts (as, of course, it would be expected to do)  the essence 
of Jevons’s theory of value - virtually in pictorial terms. The demand and supply curves show the 
fundamental functional relationships, with marginal utility and disutility depending on quantities 
demanded and supplied; equilibrium is shown at the point of intersection of the two curves, 
where quantities demanded and supplied are adjusted to the level of output at which the 
‘pleasure’ derived from the marginal unit consumed is just matched by the ‘pain’ of the marginal 
labour input into production.   
 
Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) 
 
We have a particular interest in understanding why Marshall drew his demand and supply curves 
as he did, with price on the vertical axis - and in understanding why he did not, as might have 
been expected, follow the procedure of Cournot, who alone of the few predecessors whose 
influence Marshall acknowledged, had made use of demand and supply diagrams – diagrams 
which, as we have seen, set price on the horizontal and quantity on the vertical axis. 
 
But Marshall chose not to follow Cournot’s example. It may be, though, that Marshall’s early 
study of J. S. Mill’s Principles, through which (as Marshall himself tells us) he made his first 
acquaintance with economics, had some influence - in the other direction - as regards 
diagrammatic format. If, as a mathematician engaged in what Schumpeter (1954, p.838) calls 
‘corrective reformulation’ of Mill’s ‘loose statements’, Marshall happened to sketch out 
graphical illustrations of Mill’s points about prices and markets, he would very likely - given 
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Mill’s general mode of (in effect) treating quantity as the independent variable - have found 
himself placing quantity on the horizontal axis and price on the vertical. For instance: in 
discussing the attainment of market equilibrium, Mill (1868, Bk.III, Ch.II, p.272) states that, 
 
if demand and supply are unequal at any moment, competition equalises them, and the manner in 
which this is done is by an adjustment of the value. If demand increases, the value rises; and falls, if 
the supply is increased. The rise or fall continues until the demand and supply are again equal to 
one another: and the value which a commodity will bring in any market, is no other than the value, 
which, in that market, gives a demand just sufficient to carry off the existing or expected supply. [A 
proposition equivalent to Marshall’s own later definition of ‘demand price’.]  
 
As to a possible influence of Mill on Marshall, we cannot say more than that, in formalising 
Mill’s economics, Marshall might well have become accustomed to thinking in terms of quantity 
as the independent factor: but that is no more than surmise. We suspect, however, that something 
more positive than any such mere habit may have induced Marshall, in his own mature analysis, 
to introduce the concepts of ‘demand price’ and ‘supply price’, with values interpreted as 
functions of quantities demanded and supplied. 
 
It is the case though that, from the very beginning, in his own work, Marshall thought in terms of 
price being a function of quantity rather than vice versa. His earliest surviving diagrams are of 
supply curves – illustrating various, sometimes complex, hypothetical patterns illustrating how 
unit production costs may vary with volume of production (see Whitaker, 1975). Supply price 
per unit of output, as required to cover the cost of necessary inputs, is shown to depend upon 
level of production. Essentially the same story is carried through to the Principles. A supply 
curve, showing cost per unit of output (the summation of several elements - materials, wages, 
wear and tear of machinery and buildings, interest and profit), over a range of output levels, is 
constructed (Marshall, 1956, p.286n). Quantity is shown on the horizontal axis and price on the 
vertical. Thus: 
 
measuring amounts of the commodity along Ox [the horizontal axis] and prices parallel to Oy’, we 
get for each point M along Ox a line MP drawn at right angles to it measuring the supply price for 
the amount OM, the extremity of which, P, may be called a supply point; this price MP being made 
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up of the supply prices of the several factors of production for the amount OM. The locus of P may 
be called the supply curve. 
 
Marshall presents therefore a very straightforward supply curve, Ps = ƒ(Qs), directly linking 
supply price to costs of production and the way in which these vary with output.  
 
Finally, we must observe Marshall’s derivation of his demand curve. If, as Backhouse (2002, 
p.179) tells us ‘(Marshall), after reading Jevons’s The Theory of Political Economy, grafted 
utility theory on to his theory of supply and demand by using it to explain the demand curve’ the 
similarity with Jevons is not to be wondered at. Like Gossen and Jevons, Marshall (1920/1956, 
pp.78ff) explicitly derives the demand curve from ‘the law of satiable wants’ or of ‘diminishing 
marginal utility’ – that initial and fundamental proposition being, as he states it, ‘the total utility 
of a thing to anyone (that is, the total pleasure or benefit it yields him) increases with every 
increase in his stock of it, but not as fast as his stock increases. In other words, the additional 
benefit which a person derives from a given increase of his stock of a thing, diminishes with 
every increase in the stock he already has’. Proceeding immediately from the concept of a utility 
function to that of the demand function, Marshall directly derives his ‘law of demand’: ‘the 
larger the amount of a thing that a person has the less, other things being equal, . . . will be the 
price which he will pay for a little more of it; or, in other words, his marginal demand price for it 
diminishes. 
 
At this point a footnote illustration (1920/1956, pp.81-82) demonstrates the construction of the 
(individual consumer’s) demand curve - by the same procedure as followed by Gossen and 
Jevons.  
 
Let Ox and Oy be drawn with Ox horizontally, and Oy vertically. Let pounds of tea be measured 
along Ox and the price of tea along Oy. Take Om, Om’, Om” as quantities of tea, and draw, from 
Ox, vertical lines mp, m’p’, m”p” . . . with p, p’, p” indicating demand prices for these quantities of 
tea. Then p, p’, p”, are points on [the consumer’s] demand curve for tea. [Original text abbreviated] 
 
The downward-sloping individual demand curve thus provides a graphical depiction of the 
proposition that the value the consumer places on the marginal unit is a function of quantity 
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consumed: at any point on the demand curve the price, shown by the height of the curve, 
measures for the consumer in question marginal utility as determined by the corresponding 
quantity of the commodity. The market demand curve is then arrived at by horizontal addition of 
the individual demand curves. 
 
No Marshallian anomalies 
 
Having reviewed the diagrammatic usages of Marshall and other early users of demand and 
supply ‘geometry’ there are three things which we can say with respect to Marshall’s practice of 
placing quantity on the horizontal and price on the vertical axis. 
 
(i) Firstly, it is quite clear that Marshall followed convention in measuring the independent 
variable along the x-axis and the dependent variable along the y-axis. His analysis views 
quantities demanded and supplied as the determinants of the marginal value of goods purchased 
and of the marginal cost of goods produced. Accordingly, it is in keeping with convention that he 
measures quantity on the horizontal axis and price on the vertical axis. If an impression exists, 
because Cournot and Walras put price on the horizontal axis (and because it is perhaps common 
to think of quantities as functions of price), that Marshall, in drawing his diagrams, departed 
from  mathematical convention, any such belief is certainly mistaken: it is because Marshall 
viewed the relationships involved from a different perspective than these authors, not because his 
graphics were in any way unconventional, that Marshall’s demand and supply diagrams differ 
from those of writers such as Cournot and Walras. 
 
(2) Secondly, even though Marshall’s treatment is different from that of some other eminent 
authorities, it does not follow that Marshall was, so to say, the ‘odd man out’. While, as 
compared with Marshall’s procedure, Cournot, Dupuit and Walras drew their diagrams ‘the other 
way round’, the treatment favoured by Marshall was the same as that which had been adopted by 
Gossen and Jevons. There is of course no right or wrong way in these matters, (the relationship 
between the numbers is the same regardless of which variable is on what axis) nor, would it 
appear, was one procedure more generally favoured over the other by the pioneering theorists of 
neoclassical microeconomics: the simple fact is that different authors approached these issues 
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from different perspectives and consequently adopted the particular diagrammatic format which 
accorded with their point of view. 
 
(3) Thirdly, Marshall had very positive reason for employing the particular diagrammatic format 
that he did. Marshall, and this is true also of Gossen and Jevons, saw himself as having 
uncovered a principle fundamental to the working of the economic system, the proper 
understanding of which would underpin a new vision of the functioning of the economy and of 
the nature of economics as a discipline. This of course was the marginal principle – the notion 
which informs ‘the science of small increments’, i.e. the analytical approach from which the 
basic concepts of diminishing marginal utility and increasing marginal cost derive.  
 
All these authors had a clear vision of the importance of their intellectual project. Gossen indeed 
went so far as to compare himself (no false modesty there!) with Copernicus (1854/1983. 
Author’s Preface, p.cxlvi): 
 
I believe that I have accomplished for the explanation of the relations among humans what a 
Copernicus was able to accomplish for the explanation of the relations of heavenly bodies. I believe 
that I have succeeded in discovering the force, and in its general form also the law of the effects of 
this force, that makes possible the coexistence of the human race and that governs inexorably the 
progress of mankind. 
 
Jevons likewise believed that he had found the key to a new understanding and the 
reconstruction of economics on new, and surer, foundations. From the Preface to The Theory of 
Political Economy (1871/1970, p.44): 
 
In this work I have attempted to treat economy as a calculus of pleasure and pain, and have 
sketched out, almost irrespective of all previous opinions, the form which the science, as it seems to 
me, must ultimately take. 
 
And he adds, mindful of the need to make the new ideas as clear as possible: 
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Mathematical readers may perhaps think that I have explained some elementary notions, that of the 
degree of utility for instance, with unnecessary prolixity. But it is to the neglect of economists to 
obtain clear and accurate notions of quantity and degree of utility that I venture to attribute the 
present difficulties and imperfections of the science, and have purposely dwelt on the point at full 
length. 
 
Marshall (1920/1956, p.xiv) says very much the same thing – that proper understanding of 
economic phenomena depends on adequate grasp of the marginal analysis: 
 
one of those fundamental difficulties which have underlain and troubled the economic analysis of 
past times’ . . .  [and that] ‘The new analysis is endeavouring gradually and tentatively to bring over 
into economics, as far as the widely different nature of the material will allow, those methods of 
science of small increments (commonly called the differential calculus) to which man owes directly 
or indirectly the greater part of the control that he has obtained in recent times over physical nature. 
 
It was a prime concern of these three authors to get readers to understand the new approach by 
thinking (in general) in terms of the concept of the margin and marginal substitution and (in 
particular) in terms of the law of diminishing marginal utility. The basic proposition is that 
marginal value (or cost) depends on quantity – in other words, marginal utility or marginal cost 
(and so demand price and supply price) are functions of quantity demanded or supplied. 
Presentation should be such as to give readers the ‘clearest possible notion’ of the key idea of the 
dependence of marginal value on quantity. All three authors believed diagrammatic presentation 
to be a valuable aid to understanding: it would in the circumstances seem inconceivable that they 
should – all being familiar with mathematical convention - draw their diagrams other than with 
quantity on the horizontal axis and price on the vertical.  
 
And it was worthwhile conforming to convention by measuring the independent variable along 
the x-axis and the dependent along the y-axis. That format facilitates interpretation of the 
diagram through awareness of the author’s perspective: the attention of the reader is directed to 
the author’s understanding of the key functional relationships. Note that with the Marshallian 
usage, reading along the demand curve directly illustrates the principle of diminishing marginal 
utility, the foundation stone of the whole marginalist conception - increased quantity implies 
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lower marginal value and demand price. By contrast, with price treated as the independent 
variable, the link from price to quantity is less intuitively obvious - a price change achieving a 
quantity change only indirectly as quantity is adjusted to keep the value of the marginal unit in 
line with the altered price 11.  
 
The other side of the coin here is that the authors who did not, in diagrammatic terms, treat 
quantity as the independent variable and instead put price on the horizontal axis, would appear to 
have had different intellectual priorities. Cournot, as we have seen, was not interested in offering 
any explanation of the observed relationship between price and quantity demanded. He was not 
prepared to have any analytical truck with such things as ‘quantities’ of pleasure or utility, and so 
refused to go down the road of pleasure or utility functions. Nor does Fleeming Jenkin go into 
such matters. It looks as if he was content to take the principle of diminishing marginal utility as 
given, and, making use of the demand and supply apparatus, concentrate on specific issues such 
as the effect of trade union activity on wages and employment and the welfare effects of tax 
changes on consumers’ and producers’ surplus. 
 
Dupuit’s is an interesting case. Despite being credited as one of the discoverers of the principle 
of diminishing marginal utility, he evidently didn’t think it important or interesting to explore the 
foundations of diminishing marginal utility via consideration of ‘pleasure functions’ or utility 
functions. While Gossen and Jevons and Marshall attached great significance to the discovery of 
this fundamental law and wished always to keep the quantity – marginal utility relationship to 
the fore, it looks as if Dupuit’s attention was focused more narrowly on the practical implications 
of the principle as they related to the professional concerns of a civil engineer. It is perhaps not 
surprising that, in his reflections on demand and social value, being primarily concerned with the 
impact of infrastructure improvements, and associated taxes and tolls on social welfare, he 
thought of price, not quantity, as the independent variable, and therefore put price on the 
horizontal axis. 
 
                                                 
11
  For example, Humphrey (1992, p.17) observes that Jenkin drew his demand curves (price on the x-axis) ‘with a negative 
slope indicating that lower prices are required to compensate for diminishing marginal utility of additional units bought’.  
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That brings us finally to ‘Whitaker’s allegation’ that Marshall, having begun his analysis of 
prices and markets with consideration of the supply side, and having introduced functions 
showing supply price as depending on quantity of output produced, found himself – for the sake 
of consistency with his supply curve – reluctantly forced into representing the demand curve in 
corresponding fashion with quantity demanded on the horizontal axis, a presentation said to 
conflict with the supposed ‘natural’ view of demand as a function of price. Whitaker seems to 
imply that Marshall was not too happy with this representation of demand. Having examined 
Marshall’s analysis of demand and his construction of his demand curve, we suspect that 
Whitaker may have read too much into Marshall’s footnote comment on lay views regarding the 
relationship between quantity demanded and price. What Marshall himself said (1920, p.457n) 
was this: 
 
Strictly speaking, the amount produced and the price at which it can be sold, are functions one of 
another, account being taken of the length of time allowed for the evolution of appropriate plant 
and organization for production on a large scale. But in real life, the cost of production per unit is 
deduced from the amount expected to be produced, and not vice versa. Economists commonly 
follow this practice; and they follow also the practice of business life in inverting this order with 
regard to demand. That is, they consider the increase of sales that will follow from a given 
reduction of price, more frequently than the diminution of price which will be required to effect a 
given increase of sales. 
 
Marshall, that is to say, recognised that businessmen (economists also) commonly think in terms 
of quantity demanded as a function of price. No doubt Marshall would have liked his chosen 
treatment of demand correspond, as he supposed was the case with supply, to normal business 
usage, but if Whitaker implies that Marshall considered the representation (as actually chosen) of 
quantity demanded as a function of price to be ‘unnatural’, we think that view too strong. In 
other words, although we agree that Marshall may have regretted that his representation of the 
demand curve could not be, as for public acceptability he might have liked it to be, we suggest 
that, on the other hand, he could not but have recognised the positive case for treating price as 
the dependent variable. Indeed, we believe that is precisely how - given his derivation of the 
demand function in terms of diminishing marginal utility – he would be expected, in the manner 
of several other pioneers of the marginal utility theory, to draw the demand curve. Representing 
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quantity as the independent variable, the determinant of demand price and supply price is the 
clearest possible way of emphasising to the reader the key role of the marginal principle. It 
doesn’t seem at all plausible to suggest that, had Marshall’s freedom of action not been 
constrained by the particular representation of supply curve he was employing, he might have 
adopted Cournot’s demand curve with quantity demanded measured on the vertical axis. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have reviewed how Marshall, and how a number of his contemporaries and predecessors 
chose to draw their demand and supply diagrams. Initially at least no common practice or usage 
emerged. Some authors measured price along the horizontal axis, others placed quantities 
demanded and supplied on that axis. Obviously, as one can read, or graph, the functional 
relationship depicted by a demand or supply curve either way - quantity as a function of price, or 
price as a function of quantity – in a sense it doesn’t really matter how these diagrams are drawn, 
the relationships between the numbers are the same. But we believe nevertheless that the authors 
in question were not indifferent between the alternative representations – it looks very much as if 
all (and they were all mathematically aware) made a deliberate decision about which variable 
(price or quantity) should, as the independent variable, be placed on the horizontal axis. In other 
words, the observed differences in graphical practice amongst these pioneers of microeconomic 
analysis did not occur simply at random.  
 
If following the diagrammatic convention facilitates interpretation, then these various theorists 
drew their diagrams as would best convey the conception they had in mind. Gossen, Jevons and 
Marshall wanted to demonstrate how the principle of diminishing marginal utility explained the 
shape of the demand (and supply) curve – thus their diagrams identified quantity changes as the 
operative factor determining, via diminishing marginal utility, changes in demand price. On the 
other hand, Dupuit, interested in the welfare effects of cost changes, resulting from improved 
communications or from variations in tolls or taxes, treated price as the independent variable. 
While Marshall’s treatment did differ from that of other eminent pioneers of the marginal 
analysis, such as Cournot, Dupuit and Walras that is no reason for criticism: the treatment 
favoured by each author was appropriate to his own interest and analysis. There is no reason why 
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they should all have followed the same road. No sign of convention flouted. Nor does there seem 
to be reason to think that Marshall might have followed the presentation of Cournot or Dupuit 
had he not (allegedly) found himself trapped by the representation of supply to which he was 
already committed. 
 
As to the ‘anomaly’ with which we started, while it may be due to sloppy contemporary 
exposition, no blame can be attached to any of the pioneers of ‘economic geometry’ The 
inventors of the demand and supply cross diagram approached the questions at issue with 
different priorities and from different angles, with the result that differences in diagrammatic 
presentation emerged. Any consequent complication was natural and unavoidable.  
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